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 The refugee crisis in the European Union has acted as a test for the domestic policies of 
its member states.  This is especially true for the Netherlands.  Expecting a large influx of 
refugees, the Netherlands reevaluated its refugee policies.  Consequently, the government 
decided to close down regional asylum shelters, and discontinue what was informally recognized 
as the bed-bath-bread regulation.  The new refugee policy taking its place would create reception 
centers for asylum applicants and failed asylum seekers working on a process for voluntary 
return.  The new policy would force any failed asylum seeker thought to be in noncompliance 
with voluntary return measures and any unregistered migrants, to the streets.  This protocol 
makes these individuals homeless, and creates a variety of negative effects and costs for the 
state.  Also, it fails to implement any mechanism that actually ensures return.  This paper 
analyzes the new refugee policy, and highlights both desirable and undesirable outcomes.  It then 
provides alternatives, and discusses the costs and benefits of each.  A recommendation is then 
provided.  The reopening of the shelters along with a failed asylum seeker contribution plan is 
recommended as it provides the least amount of costs for the state, and allows for monitoring of 
these individuals along with accessibility to government support. 
 
1) The Netherlands’ New Refugee Policy 
  
The Problem 
 On April 22, 2015, the Prime Minister Mark Rutte and the Deputy Prime Minister 
Asscher announced the plan to close all bed, bath, and bread shelters, ending what was known as 
the “bed-bath-bread regulation” (NOS 2015).  Under the premise of the new refugee policy, the 
government would replace the thirty regional shelters with six reception centers, and would 
require asylum seekers who are denied refugee status to comply with voluntary return measures.  
The previous policy allowed individuals to stay indefinitely at the shelters irrespective of their 
application status (Bahceli 2015).   The new policy places these individuals who are not going 
through the application or a voluntary return policy, on the street.  Specifically, the new policy 
gives failed asylum seekers twenty-eight days to prepare for return to country of origin after 
receiving notification that their application has been denied.  If an asylum seeker fails to leave 
within this time, then he must prove to the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) that 
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failure to leave was at no fault of his own, in which case, his stay in the asylum center can be 
extended.  If the asylum seeker does attempt to go through this secondary process after twenty-
eight days or cannot prove that failure to return was of no fault of his own, then he is evicted 
from the asylum center (Government of the Netherlands 2016).  The new policy also requires 
asylum seekers to have proper documentation, with inadequate proof of origin resulting in a 
denied application, and the cut off of support and shelter (Bahceli 2015).   
 The problem with this new refugee policy is in its failure to implement a mechanism that 
actually ensures voluntary return.  Instead, it ensures an increase in issues associated with 
homelessness and individuals living on the street.  Failed asylum seekers who are unable to leave 
but can prove they are attempting to comply with voluntary return procedures, are able to stay 
indefinitely in the centers as they work the system, while those who refuse to return or are unable 
to do so due to lack of appropriate documentation and issues with their country of origin, are 
simply forced out of the centers to live on the street.  Undocumented migrants are also left out of 
this new policy and will be forced to live on the street as they are denied access to the centers, 
whereas the previous policy and its bed-bath-bread shelters were open to anyone claiming to be 
an asylum seeker or refugee (Bahceli 2015).    
 
Causes of the Problem 
 This section addresses the context and situations that led to the creation of the problem, 




 The enduring conflict in Syria and the refugee crisis that has emerged from its chaos and 
destruction has acted as a catalyst for the reevaluation of the international community’s 
humanitarian policies.  This is largely due to the fact that a mass influx of asylum seekers has 
poured into the European Union for protection. Consequently, each member state has met 
collectively with other members in order to discuss a way of dealing with the amount of fleeing 
individuals.  A concrete plan has yet to be developed.  Instead, each state has reviewed their own 
domestic policies to evaluate their efficiency in maintaining the international norms and their 
system of governance capacity to enforce them.  During these evaluations, policies have been 
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adapted or changed to meet the current global environment.  In this light, the refugee crisis in 
itself, can be considered less of a problem relating to a large influx of individuals flooding 
European borders, but rather a “crisis of policy” as depicted by Don Flynn, director of Migrant’s 
Rights Network, in which joint and domestic policy is tested and purified by the strains put on 
them during this period of vast migration (Flynn 2016). 
 The announcement of the new refugee policy in the Netherlands was made after a review 
of its own domestic policies, in order to meet the challenges of the ongoing refugee crisis. The 
government knew that the capacity of the state to accommodate incoming asylum seekers would 
be strained, and therefore, sought to remove failed asylum seekers’ access to resources to free up 
costs and accommodation for future applicants (NOS 2015).  The IND had received a total of 
24,535 asylum applications in 2014. This number was expected to double, and the government 
received 34,958 by September 2015.  The rejection rate of asylum seeker applications for this 
first half of 2015 was at 30 percent (Dutch Council for Refugees 2015).  Further information on 
asylum applications per year can be found in the IND’s monthly Asylum Trends reports.     
 
Anti-Immigration Political Stronghold 
 The majority of newspapers covering the policy change affecting failed asylum seekers, 
describes the political deliberation as a strong arming of lesser parties by a powerful anti-
immigration coalition party.  Anti-immigration parties are described as increasing in popularity, 
and thus, forcing its motives and ideals on the smaller member parties.  Geert Wilders, head of 
the Freedom Party (PVV) is a far-right politician whose popularity has increased due to his anti-
immigration policies (Expatica 2015).  Wilders party became the Netherlands’ second largest 
party during elections in 2009 (Entzinger 2010, 231).  After winning the majority of votes in 
2012, the Liberal Party (VVD) has expressed that the refugee crisis and anti-immigration 
discourse would make the Freedom Party (PVV) more popular in the coming elections 
(Hauwermeiren 2015). The increase in political power of this anti-immigration party explains 
where the new policy for refugees is coming from as it is an effect of anti-immigration ideas. 
 
Parliamentary Crisis 
 While the refugee crisis has increased the popularity of some political parties in the 
Netherlands, it has also increased political conflict.  Prior to proposing to parliament the policy 
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to close down the bed-bath-bread shelters and replacing them with asylum centers, members 
within several of the parties and the heads of leading parties were in complete disagreement as to 
what responsibility the state had in providing for failed asylum seekers and the effectiveness of 
the proposed policy to motivate voluntary return.  There were doubts that the policy would be 
accepted by the parliament, let alone by asylum seekers and municipalities.  The Deputy Prime 
Minister Asscher stated that the policy was “above all a political deal primarily intended to avert 
a government crisis”, referring to the possibility of a breakup of coalition parties if they remained 
unable to come to an agreement (Wiegel 2015).   
 Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who competes against Geert Wilders for votes, and his 
Liberal party, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) struggled to persuade their 
coalition Labour Party (PvdA) to support the policy.  Rutte was a strong supporter of the policy 
change, stating that providing resources to failed asylum seekers who could return to their 
country of origin would be “crazy” (Bahceli 2015).  However, the solution supported by Rutte is 
again, similar to previous policies that were criticized due to a lack of provision of basic needs 
for both applicants and failed asylum seekers.  These past policies were also deemed inefficient 
for improving voluntary return.  This along with the fact that the proposed policy almost created 
a government crisis provides no reassurance that the new refugee policy will actually work.  
Furthermore, the new policy seems to have been created as a solution to a parliamentary conflict 
versus a well thought out plan for dealing with the influx of refugees (Wiegel 2015). 
 
The Schengen Agreement:  Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 15 March 2006 Establishing a Community Code on the Rules Governing the 
Movement of Persons Across Borders 
 Regulation No. 562/2006 establishes the protocols that open the borders of member 
states, otherwise recognized as the Schengen Borders Code.  While it provides measures for 
checkpoints and security along the exterior border of the Schengen area, the regulation “provides 
for the absence of border control of persons crossing the internal borders between the Member 
States of the European Union” (2006/562/EC, 3).  It is important to note though, that neither the 
United Kingdom nor Ireland take part in this agreement, although both are members of the EU.   
 What is significant about this international law is the challenge it poses member states 
during the present refugee crisis.  It allows refugees to flood certain member states once they 
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have entered the Schengen border.  Member states have threatened to close their own borders or 
form a smaller Schengen agreement radius that bonds states more capable of keeping all 
migrants outside its borders, and not allowing them entrance without going through the 
appropriate immigration channels.  The Netherlands has been one of these states proposing a 
temporary reduced Schengen border which would exclude southern states such as Greece in 
order to bolster its own security and better control the number of incoming asylum seekers.  It 
would also allow more capable states to protect citizens from threats such as Daesh who have 
claimed to be infiltrating states with asylum seekers (Ottens 2015).   
 Despite some states’ own increase of border security and security checkpoints, the 
Schengen agreement has continued to hold, allowing some asylum seekers to relocate to a 
member state of preference after they have already registered in another state, a process which 
complicates measures established by the Dublin Regulation.  According to the Dublin 
Regulation, it is the state of registration that holds and maintains the obligation to process an 
individual’s asylum application and thereby grant residency.  As a result, member states have 
complained that the current Schengen agreement does not ensure asylum applicants stay in one 
state, and again, allows them to flock and encumber preferred EU states (Bond 2016).  Because 
of the open borders, the same can be said in regards to failed asylum seekers.  Once an 
application has been denied and the conditions in a state are found to be undesirable for a failed 
asylum seeker, there are no internal border security protocols that prevent an individual from 
traveling to a state where failed asylum seekers are better accommodated.  This can cause 
flooding in a state similar to the refugee crisis, but this time because of more lenient asylum 
policies which result in an uneven distribution of asylum seekers in the European Union.  The 
understanding of the complications of the Schengen Agreement as it is related to the refugee 
crisis, continually contributes to the production of tough immigration policies produced by the 
Netherlands (Ottens 2015).     
 
Asylum Process 
 Now that the causes of the problem have been addressed, it is important to understand the 
asylum application process and the extent to which the asylum procedure has changed.  This will 
allow for a better understanding of the effects and extent of the problem.  The asylum seeking 
process begins with individual’s registration with the Aliens Police at the Central Reception 
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Facility in Ter Apel or at the Schiphol airport with the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee.  
Registration at Ter Apel can take up to two days, but after this a “rest and preparation period” is 
granted in which the Dutch Council for Refugees (VWN) will provide information and 
legal/medical assistance over a period of no less than six days (IND 2016).  The applicant is 
instructed to stay in a “reception location” near one of the Immigration and Naturalisation 
Service offices where the application will be submitted (IND 2016).   Individuals at the Schiphol 
reception center do not receive accommodation at a reception location for the duration of the rest 
and preparation timeframe. Instead, they remain at the Schiphol reception center where they will 
have access to legal/medical assistance within a few days of their stay.  The application process 
at the Schiphol center is slightly expedited for the many asylum seekers who arrive by plane, and 
the application for asylum is submitted there (IND 2016). 
 All applicants then go through an interviewing process.  If the application requires an 
extended amount of time for review, the applicant is moved to a different reception center, and 
the final decision will be made within a six month period. This process may also be extended for 
an additional six months.  Once an applicant is determined to be a refugee and granted asylum, 
they are given a “temporary residence permit” that lasts for five years; after the five years, the 
applicant can apply for a “permanent residence permit” if he qualifies (IND 2016).  
 The permanent residence permit may be denied if it is determined that the applicant no 
longer fulfills the characteristics of a refugee which can occur when a conflict subsides.  The 
government produces a “safe list” in which applicants from regions that have been determined 
safe are required to return upon the denying of their application.  However, there is a chance that 
countries on this list will revert back to an unsafe condition, in which time they may be taken off 
the list (Government of the Netherlands 2016).  An example of this process is seen in the 
extension of asylum for Iraqis; denied applications were recently suspended due to the threat of 
Daesh in the region (Dutch Council for Refugees 2016). 
 Individual asylum seekers can gain the initial temporary residence permit by meeting one 
of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service’s qualifications.  These qualifications are in place 
to determine the applicant as a refugee and therefore, eligibility for asylum.  When he meets the 
qualifications he is considered to have a refugee status and given asylum along with the 
temporary residence permit.  An applicant may qualify for asylum if he fits the characteristics of 
a refugee as determined by Article 1A of the Geneva Convention:  “fear of being persecuted for 
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reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion…” (Dutch Council for Refugees 2016).  If the applicant does not meet these 
characteristics, he may qualify under the conditions of subsidiary protection as described in 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 15 (c) of the Qualification 
Directive (2011/95/EU) which further defines situations, such as the threat of serious harm, in 
which a member state should not return an applicant to his country of origin (Dutch Council for 
Refugees 2016).   
 A third condition in which asylum seekers can gain a temporary residence permit is 
extended to family members of those who have already been granted asylum in the Netherlands.  
A temporary residence permit can be granted if the individual had arrived with a said family 
member or within three months of a family member’s granted asylum application date.  This is 
part of a family reunification process, and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service does not 
indicate what family bond is required when submitting an application (IND 2016).   
 Altogether, requests for asylum and refugee residency permits can be denied if the 
applicant had resided in or previously applied in another European Union state, if an application 
for asylum in the Netherlands had been previously denied and no “new relevant facts” for 
acceptance are available, if the applicant poses a “risk to public order and national security, or if 
the applicant submits information that is incorrect (IND 2016).   
 When an asylum application is rejected, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service 
provides a given date that is twenty- eight days from the day it was denied.  An asylum seeker 
must leave the Netherlands before this date.  The denied applicant continues to receive financial 
support from the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) during this period 
of twenty-eight days (Government of the Netherlands 2016).  If the applicant is in a situation 
where he cannot leave of his own accord due to lack of funds or improper travel documents, he is 
told to contact the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) for assistance and financial 
aid. Otherwise, the denied applicant can face deportation (IND 2016).  The denied applicant may 
also be forced to pay a deposit or be placed in a detention center if he is found to be somehow 
evading the process of return.  If return travel cannot be secured due to a missing document, the 
Repatriation and Departure Service can “mediate” for the individual at their respective embassy 
or consulate (Government of the Netherlands 2016).  Any denied applicant can submit an appeal 
to the Aliens Chamber within a week of the decision; stay in the Netherlands is only permitted if 
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a preliminary ruling by the court is requested.  Denied extended stay applicants have four weeks 
to submit an appeal and are permitted to stay in the Netherlands.  A denied applicant may again 
apply for a residence permit if he can prove that he has exhausted all available resources and is 
unable to leave the Netherlands “through no fault or action of your own” (IND 2016).  
 If the applicant has not submitted an appeal after his application has been denied during 
any of the previously mentioned processes, he is completely cut off from government support at 
the end of the designated date of departure.  It is also at this point that he loses access to the 
reception centers.  This cut off of support and access to shelter is the change found in the new 
refugee policy (Withnall 2015).  Previously, the government allowed asylum seekers, despite the 
condition of their status, to have access to the regional bed-bath-bread shelters.  Under the new 
policy, these shelters are closed and failed asylum seekers who cannot or will not return to their 
country of origin are forced to live illegally without government accommodation (Waldron and 
Ali 2015).  A supplementary condition of the policy ensures that migrants in general do not have 
access to shelters and basic provisions that was found in the bed-bath-bread regulation.  The new 
policy requires all migrants to register, be documented, and go through the residency application 
process if they want to gain access to government support and accommodation.  If an 
undocumented migrant avoids registration and the proper application process, he can be detained 
and eventually deported along with failed asylum seekers who do not cooperate with voluntary 
return (Withnall 2015). 
 
Scope and Magnitude of the Problem 
 This section identifies and addresses the effects of the new policy, and the extent to 
which it creates a problem for the state.  In all, the new refugee policy poses serious 
ramifications for the state.  Municipalities are in disagreement with the policy, and some have 
refused to enforce it. The resistance of the policy could incite protests and national disorder.  The 
European Commission and the United Nations have criticized the new policy, claiming that it 
goes against humanitarian law.  The policy essentially places both failed asylum seekers and 
undocumented migrants on the street after the government asylum process fails to return them to 
their country of origin.  Placing these individuals on the street does not meet the goal of 
voluntary return.  Instead, it makes individuals homeless, and an increase of homelessness incurs 





 Complications with the new refugee policy change are evident in its rejection by the 
Netherlands’ own municipalities.  Not wanting failed asylum seekers “living” on their streets, 
they continue to provide them with food and shelter (The Economist 2015).  While cities relied 
on national funding for the regional shelters and asylum seeker provisions, some mayors have 
refused to comply with the closing of the facilities, stating that they will look for alternative 
funds in order to keep facilities open (Bahceli 2015).  In refusing to enforce the policy, cities 
undermine the effectiveness of the policy in its goal of incentivizing self-return.  This situation is 
similar to the undermining of asylum policy that occurred in 2001, when Utrecht first proposed 
its own “‘bread, bed, and bath’ plan” to provide for denied asylum seekers despite the 
Netherlands initiative to drive them out of the country within twenty-eight days of their 
application’s rejection (Lovett and Schimmer 2001).  Municipal undermining of state policy 
threatens government legitimacy, and the process as a whole is a repetition of past events which 
had resulted in the state’s increased responsibility in caring for failed asylum seekers found in 
the bed-bath-bread regulation. Therefore, the current policy change is part of a cycle in which the 
state is most likely going to have to reestablish means for caring for failed asylum seekers in the 
future.  
  
Protests and Noncompliance 
 Because the current refugee policy changes reflect the conditions set by previous 
ineffective asylum policies, enforcement of this policy may result in a reoccurrence of problems 
that require government and international organization intervention. Furthermore, the evicting of 
failed asylum seekers and the decrease of available shelter may result in protests, and 
consequently increased police confrontations, mirroring events that occurred in the Netherlands 
in 2012.   During that time, the Dutch government had created temporary structures of 
accommodation for Iraqi asylum seekers.  Residence was not granted to several of these asylum 
seekers because of the changing conditions in Iraq.  It was determined that the state was safe 
enough for individuals’ to return.  Again, failed asylum seekers were expected to leave either 
voluntarily or forcibly after receiving notice of their applications.  Despite Iraq being declared a 
safe state, the Iraqi government refused to accept asylum seekers who had left during the war and 
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now were being forced to return.  This made it impossible for some of the asylum seekers to 
return, making them reliant on Dutch services and accommodations (Kamphuis 2014).   
 When the asylum seekers were notified of their denied residency permits and that they 
would have to leave their accommodations, the failed asylum seekers held a series of protests 
throughout the Netherlands.  The failed asylum seekers refused to comply with the Immigration 
Services.  As a result, the Dutch police had to forcibly evict asylum seekers, and close down 
shelters.  Non-government organizations, such as Vluchtkerk, then began to care for these 
populations and complain about the conditions that state policy placed on failed asylum seekers 
which lead to the European Committee of Social Rights’ 2013 ruling, the Netherlands must 
provide for the basic needs of all individuals within its borders (Kamphuis 2014).  Once again, 
the new policy change is not necessarily a new policy, making it likely for a reoccurrence of past 
events.  While the possibility of protests and costs associated with increased use of the police 
force remain, issues relating to humanitarian law have already been identified. 
 
Humanitarian Law 
 The new refugee policy would seem a reasonable solution for motivating denied asylum 
seekers to voluntarily return, but instead, it has been received with heavy criticism, and 
implicates Netherlands’ parliament of non-compliance to humanitarian law.   Prior to the new 
policy’s announcement, the Netherlands had been struggling against allegations of inhumane 
practices relating to undocumented migrants and asylum seekers within its borders.  As 
previously mentioned, the European Committee of Social Rights ruled that the Netherlands 
needed to care for all individuals within its borders in 2013.  In the fall of 2014, the Netherlands 
was told by the Council of Europe that there is a legal responsibility to “ensure failed asylum 
seekers” and other individuals living in the state, have the necessities for living such as food, 
shelter, and clothing; following this, the United Nations sent the government an Urgent Appeal 
Letter reminding the state of this responsibility in the coming winter months (Dutch News.nl 
2014).  
 On the 16
th
 of April 2015, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe made 
follow up resolutions concerning complaints lodged by the European Federation of National 
Organisations working with the Homeless and the Conference of European Churches.  These 
complaints were regarding the government of the Netherlands’ responsibility towards asylum 
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seekers in providing food and shelter to “undocumented and homeless migrants” in accordance 
to the European Social Charter.  In the resolutions CM/ResChS(2015)4 and CM/ResChS(2015)5, 
the Committee unanimously found the Netherlands in violation of Article 31 p.2 (right to 
housing), Article 13 p.1 and 4 (right to social and medical assistance, Article 19 p.4(c) (right of 
migrant workers and their families to protection and assistance), and Article 30 (right to 
protection against poverty and social exclusion) (Glakoumopoulos 2015).   
 Since the announcement of the change of the new policy, negative critiques continue to 
question the suitability of the reception center protocols.  In August of 2015, a UN report from 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination negatively reviewed the changes, 
stating that provisions must be made for maintaining minimal living standards (Deutsch 2015).  
These considerations alone make it necessary for the Netherlands’ government to carefully 
consider further initiatives in promoting self-expulsion, knowing that international pressures are 
liable to make further accusations against the state.  However, the Committee’s resolutions are 
not “legally binding”, and therefore, do not maintain as much authority over domestic practices 
as international and regional treaties such as those in the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Sierra, Guettache, and Kovtun 2014, 5).  During a case regarding an Iranian migrant’s right to 
housing, The Netherlands’ State Council ruled that the “‘European Convention on Human Rights 
does not oblige the government to unconditionally provide a roof to unsuccessful asylum 
seekers’”, legitimizing the government’s new refugee policy, and allowing for its 
implementation while ignoring international criticism of its stance towards failed refugees 
(Expatica 2015).  Despite the domestic ruling, the Netherlands must be prepared for continued 
criticism of the new policy and the plausibility of future rulings and declarations made by the 
international and regional bodies which may implicate the Netherlands of non-compliance to 
humanitarian law.  In the occurrence of such circumstances, the Netherlands may be required to 




 The closing down of the bed-bath-bread shelters and the eviction of failed asylum seekers 
to the street will have various social and economic ramifications as the process makes these 
individuals homeless.  Homelessness impacts every state and society differently.  This and a 
Hess 12 
 
general underreporting of failed asylum seekers by homeless services makes it difficult to 
examine the extent to which failed asylum seekers living on the street would impact the Dutch 
kingdom.  Also, some organizations are reluctant because of their service mandate, to report 
immigrants residing in the country illegally to Dutch authorities (Pleace 2010, 149-150). Yet, 
analysis has been conducted outlining the general impact of homelessness in the European 
Union, which allows one to recognize that there is an increase in costs associated with the 
increase of individuals living on the street. 
 The European Federation of National Organisations working with the Homeless 
(FEANTSA), a non-government organization, outlined possible financial costs of an increase in 
homelessness in their 2013 report on “The Costs of Homelessness in Europe”.  In the report the 
European Observatory on Homelessness (EOH) highlighted a cost increase in several services 
that are directly related to supporting homeless individuals.  The first cost increase associated 
with homelessness is found in the provision of services for the homeless, as money would have 
to be allocated to an increase in “specialist, specific services that are targeted on preventing, 
reducing or mitigating the effects of homelessness” (Pleace, Baptista, Benjaminsen, and Busch-
Geertsema 2013, 11).  Various organizations that work towards poverty reduction and issues 
relating to homelessness would find themselves increasingly taxed for resources as failed asylum 
seekers would flock to these services. The organizations would then have to petition for an 
increase in financial support from government and other funding institutions to ensure they can 
continue to provide for these homeless individuals. 
 The second noticeable increase in costs would include an increase in financial strain 
within the health and social sector.  Homeless individuals, especially failed asylum seekers 
unaccustomed to the weather conditions of the Netherlands, may be more susceptible to illnesses 
while living on the street.  There is a possibility that the harsh conditions that homeless 
individuals endure may prompt them to use “emergency medical and psychiatric services” more 
than the general public (Pleace, Baptista, Benjaminsen, and Busch-Geertsema 2013, 11).  This 
increase in use of medical facilities would require more state investment as medical resources are 
spent treating the homeless.    
 The third cost increase involves the judicial system.  There would be an increase in costs 
for the criminal justice system as homeless individuals have more contact with enforcement 
officers due to legality issues of squatting and other street living practices.  Some common issues 
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that cause homeless individuals to fall into the criminal justice system involve the public use of 
alcohol and unconventional drugs which can make them violent and aggressive towards others 
(Pleace, Baptista, Benjaminsen, and Busch-Geertsema 2013, 11). 
 Homeless individuals also influence economic productivity, which is especially true for 
failed migrants.  Because these individuals often lack access to legitimate work, the government 
and society loses the opportunity to capitalize on these individuals.  When asylum seekers are 
granted a work permit, the government is able to tax these individuals’ income, allowing the 
state economy to fully profit from their labor and work contributions.  Failed asylum seekers 
have no access to legitimate work because they are not granted a working permit that is 
associated with their residency application.  Therefore, these individuals have to resort to 
illegitimate work for money which may involve criminality, negating any profit for the state, and 
possibly creating further criminal judiciary costs (Pleace, Baptista, Benjaminsen, and Busch-
Geertsema 2013, 12).  An increase of homeless individuals on the street may also affect tourism, 
as tourists’ preference of destinations may change do to appearances of people living in harsh 
conditions or crowding streets.  Furthermore, homelessness may affect “trade” and “societal 
cohesion” as their presence on streets and in various neighborhoods reduces the value and 
perception of wealth of the location (Pleace, Baptista, Benjaminsen, and Busch-Geertsema 2013, 
12).  
 Lastly, as determined by the FEANTSA report, homelessness may also have a direct 
negative impact on the failed asylum seeker as he is forced to live an un-opportunistic life style.  
Living as a homeless individual can result in “negative long term social, economic and health 
consequences” for failed asylum seekers, as the conditions to which they are daily exposed to, 
and the lack of legal working opportunities, increasingly jeopardizes their social and physical 
health, and prevents them from accumulating wealth  (Pleace, Baptista, Benjaminsen, and Busch-
Geertsema 2013, 12). 
 
2) Evaluation Criteria 
 
Goals of the Policy  
 In its essence, the new refugee policy was created to meet the following three goals:  
incentivize voluntary return for denied asylum seekers, free-up provisions for incoming asylum 
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seekers, and avert a government crisis caused by parliamentary party disagreement on how to 
deal with refugees.   As such, these goals were also the desired outcomes, but as seen through the 
discussion on the effects of the problem, the policy has created immediate and the possibility of 
several undesirable outcomes.  These outcomes are discussed in the following section. 
 
Outcomes 
 While the ultimate goals of the refugee policy included the free-up of provisions for 
incoming asylum seekers, the aversion of a government crisis, and incentivizing voluntary 
return, the only viewable desirable outcomes noticed in the literature could be the fact that the 
state reduced costs associated with providing failed asylum seekers indefinite provisions and 
shelter when they closed down the regional shelters.  Another desirable outcome would be the 
fact that the refugee policy did avert a government crisis when the parties agreed on its measures.  
The last desirable outcome is that the new policy actually requires all statuses of asylum seekers 
to comply with state regulations prior to receiving government assistance.  What is missing from 
these desirable outcomes is the incentivizing of voluntary return as there is no information that 
would demonstrate that the policy is actually efficient in this aspect.  Instead, the International 
Organization for Migration in the Netherlands says that “involuntary and voluntary returns are 
interlinked and have a mutually reinforcing effect.  A number of European states have found that 
voluntary return has been most successful where involuntary return is also resorted to” (IOM 
2004, 7).   
 Statistics of those who have used the Netherlands’ assisted voluntary return program 
show that in 2015, 2,941 failed asylum seekers returned which is an increase from 2,269 in 2014 
and 2,489 in 2013, but these statistics are significantly lower than those from 2011 when 3,473 
used the assisted program (IOM 2015).  The asylum requests for 2015 and 2014 were higher than 
that of 2011 with a total of 45,035 and 24,535 applications.  In 2013, there were 13,095 asylum 
applications and 14,630 in 2011 (StatLine 2016).  These statistics indicate that either there is no 
correlation between asylum applications and voluntary return, or that voluntary return is 
decreasing despite new initiatives to incentivize the process.  These statistics though, are not 
indicative of how many failed asylum seekers returned without government assistance as there is 
no monitoring system in place that would allow for such evaluation.  So it is possible that there 
has been an increase of failed asylum seekers leaving of their own accord.    
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 As previously stated, the undesirable outcomes are the negative effects of the new 
refugee policy.  A list of the desirable and undesirable outcomes is easily visible in the following 
table.  
 
Desirable Outcomes Undesirable Outcomes  
Reduction of Government Funded 
Asylum Shelters 
Municipality Resistance 
-undermining of government legitimacy 
-reduction of the policy’s efficiency  
-future change or reversal of the refugee policy 
Protests and Noncompliance 
-confrontation of failed asylum seekers with government authorities 
-NGOs step in to care for failed asylum seekers, undermining policy efficiency 
Conflict Regarding Refugee Policies 
within Parliament Subsided 
Increased Allegations of Humanitarian Law Non-Compliance 
-submission of complaints by individuals and organizations to regional and international 
human rights bodies 
-International and regional organizations’ ruling against the Netherlands’ refugee policy 
-compensation having to be paid by the state 
-future change or reversal of the refugee policy 
Asylum Seekers Have to Register and 
Comply with Protocols to Receive 
Government Assistance 
Increased Costs associated with Homelessness 
-homelessness services 
-health and service sector 
-criminal judicial system 
-economic productivity   
 
 
Quantifying Illegal Stay 
 Once again, determining the impact of homelessness is difficult due to under reporting.  
This is also true of failed asylum seekers and illegal stay migrants in general.  Estimations of the 
total amount of failed asylum seekers remaining in the Netherlands illegally would help indicate 
to what extent the new refugee policy is needed in incentivizing voluntary return, and also 
whether it is failing in its initiative of increasing return to countries of origin.  Determining the 
total amount of individuals residing in the Netherlands illegally is a difficult task due to the fact 
that many remain undocumented, especially failed asylum seekers who do not register to use 
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available resources for voluntary return or refuse to comply with the return process altogether.  
Eurostat collected statistics on migrants illegally residing in the Netherlands from 2008 to 2012.  
The statistics indicate the numbers of illegally residing migrants falling prior to 2012.  The 
highest recorded presence of  these migrants being from third world countries was at a high in 
2010 at 7,580 and fell to 6,145 in 2011 (Eurostat 2015). These figures can be compared to the 
total asylum applications that occurred within this period; there was an overall decrease of 
applications in 2010 from 12,700 to 11,300 in 2011 (IND 2012, 16). The correlation of the 
statistics of both the number of illegal residencies and total applications may be indicative of a 
relationship in which the increase of one means an increase of the other.  Despite this 
observation, these figures are hardly indicative of the current amount of undocumented migrants 
residing in the state now since the asylum seekers have surpassed a record of application 
submissions, totaling over 53,000.  This application record was set during the 1994 conflicts in 
Yugoslavia (Pieters 2015).  Altogether, the IND reported a total of 58,880 applications for the 
year 2015, and stated that this figure nearly doubled the total of applications from 2014 (IND 
2016). 
 Ultimately, only estimations can be made in regards to the total amount of undocumented 
or illegal stay migrants within the Netherlands.  Humanity in Action estimated that around 5,000 
individuals became undocumented post the government’s denial of 9,810 asylum applications in 
2012.  Amnesty International said this denial rate was 56% of all asylum applications (Sierra, 
Guettache, and Kovtun 2014, 6).  A report produced by Vluchtelingenwerk, a Dutch organization 
that works directly with refugees, estimated that around 5,000 of rejected asylum seekers 
remained in the Netherlands in 2014 while total applications for asylum were over 24,000 (The 
Economist 2015).  Wereldhuis or Worldhouse, a resource center for migrants, estimates that 
around 15,000 undocumented reside solely in Amsterdam, having come to the Netherlands by 
various means such as human trafficking, and for various reasons (wereldhuis 2016).  However, 
upon questioning the organization in regards to this statistic, it appears that its estimation is 
rather outdated, and also non-indicative of today’s totals.  Despite this, the statistic was 
calculated through a process of cross-referencing numbers of illegally residing migrants that 
were arrested by the police, a process which provides a calculation based off of actual 
government documentation (Heijden, Gils Cruijff, and Hessen 2006).  Other media sources 
estimate a total of 100,000 undocumented individuals living in the entire state (Expatica 2015).  
Hess 17 
 
 Another way to try and determine the extent of undocumented or illegal stay migrants in 
the Netherlands would be to consider rates of return.  According to statistics gathered on 
migrants who entered the Netherlands in 1995, one in three immigrants returned home after six 
years, and it was noted that asylum seekers were less prone to leave (CBS 2003).  Aside from 
this information, there appears to be no data collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
in the Netherlands, regarding the return of asylum seekers or migrants to their country of origin 
within more recent years.   
 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) maintains statistical 
reports on the Netherlands. The agency reported a total of 82,494 refugees living in the 
Netherlands in June of 2015. The UNHCR determined who qualified as a refugee for the 
statistics with the descriptions indicated by international law, by the total of individuals who 
gained some degree of protection, and by determining if an individual was in a refugee like 
condition within the Netherlands.  At the same time, the UNHCR reported a total of 8,097 
pending applications, and determined a total of 1,951 stateless people residing within the border. 
However, as far as the total of returned for the first half of 2015, the UNHCR had no statistical 
data on how many failed refugees were returned to their country of origin, neither was there any 
accessible data from previous years for further estimations (UNHCR 2016).  Furthermore, the 
only real viable indication to determine the extent of illegal stay or failed asylum seekers and 
whether they pose a serious threat to the state of Netherlands would be visible in an increase of 
crime or public squatting.  These indicators were proposed by those in opposition of the policy 
change, believing the closure of the shelters would force individuals to a life of crime and 
violence while living on the streets (Darroch 2014).  Therefore, future evaluation of the 
efficiency of failed asylum seeker policies should rely on failed asylum seeker crime reports if 
they are accessible. 
 
Assessing Alternatives 
  In assessing alternatives, it is important to evaluate options while keeping the goals of 
the current or new policy in mind.  By doing this, it will be possible to establish whether an 
alternative satisfies the goals or objectives established by the government, and increase the 
likelihood of it being accepted by parliament.  The alternatives must also be considered in 
relation to their costs and benefits, knowing that a policy in which the costs outweigh the total 
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number of benefits is not likely to be accepted, and that if certain costs are too high, it may prove 
difficult for the state to implement.  A thorough comparison of costs and benefits will be laid out 
in the fourth section for an easy comparison.  
 
3) Alternative Policies and Their Assessment 
 This section includes an examination of various ideas and policies concerning failed 
asylum seekers, and provides suggestions for improvements in consideration to their 
implementation.  A cost benefit analysis is provided for each suggestion, highlighting the 
difficulties and expenditures associated with each respectively, and how adjustment of ideas to 
the circumstances in the Netherlands can either improve the current asylum policy or be 
emplaced as a substitutive solution.  
 
Return Expansion 
 The Netherlands can expand the initiative to assist countries in receiving returned 
refugees.  This alternative is part of an initiative that is already being considered in the 
Netherlands, and its expansion would increase the efficiency of the voluntary return policy as it 
makes provisions for failed asylum seekers in their country of origin so that they can and will 
want to return.  In April of 2015, the Dutch government put forward a plan to provide funds from 
the Development and Cooperation budget to assist African nations in building shelter and 
accommodations for returning refugees.  This initiative was proposed to correspond with the 
closing down of the several asylum centers, and was meant to increase the overall incentives for 
voluntary return.  However, the proposed plan is limited in efficiency as it does not consider 
failed asylum seekers from other regions.  This initiative is limited to a specific region.  For a 
more beneficial application, it should be extended to other countries which have a high rate of 
asylum seeker applicants in the Netherlands.  Such an agreement should be considered for states 
located in the Middle East that have been declared safe, knowing that the conflicts in this region 
has likely destroyed homes and displaced millions of individuals (Bilak et al. 2015, 9). 
 As far as costs, the funds should continue to be exchanged with states for cooperation in 
accepting failed asylum seekers.  It is possible that the funds will actually help initiate 
cooperation with states where returns were previously not accepted.  The cost of the initial 
project was expected to start at 30 million euros with an increase over time.   Part of this budget 
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was meant for the North African Search and Rescue missions, while the rest was to be allocated 
to African countries that cooperate in the return of refugees (Pieters 2015).  This cost would have 
to rise significantly as funds would be allocated to other regions, and the Dutch government 
would have to locate other local or regional organizations to oversee the construction of shelter 
for returning asylum seekers in these other regions.  
 In critical examination of this initiative, it is practical in cases where individuals decide to 
return voluntarily, but it does nothing to address the cases where failed asylum seekers cannot 
return to country of origin or refuse to return.  It is these two groups of asylum seekers that make 
shutting down several of the asylum centers extremely problematic. Forced returns are often 
costly as it requires a government to charter a plane and personnel that will assist with the return 
of an individual.  For example, in 2009, it cost Norway between 8,700-9,500 euros per individual 
for their forcible return while assisted voluntary programs only cost the state 1,300 euros per 
individual.  Sweden’s forced return cost an average of 6,500 euros per individual while voluntary 
return assistance programs cost the state an average 600 euros.  The United Kingdom’s estimated 
average of forced return per individual, nearly doubles both countries’ statistics as its costs were 
around 14,500 euros in 2009 to 2010 (Black, Collyer, and Somerville 2011, 5).    It is because of 
these associated high costs, that the Netherlands’ government emphasizes voluntary return 
(Economist 2015).  In failing to motivate or provide the conditions in which failed asylum 
seekers can and will return, forced returns would be the only remaining option outside of 
granting temporary residency.  This contribution in costs would question the efficiency of the 
voluntary return, and whether the money could be better invested.  Altogether, this alternative 
does not propose any real solution that ensures return.  Instead, its benefits are found in its 
increase of cooperation and relationships with countries of origin, and making it more likely for 
the country of origin to accept forced returns. 
 
Cost Contribution 
 The Dutch government could expand its current policy that requires some asylum seekers 
to contribute towards the cost of provisions, to include failed asylum seekers in exchange for 
continued accommodation. This process has already been in practice since 2008 for asylum 
seekers with high earnings, and it has been enforced by the refugee settlement agency (COA).  It 
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has been reported by the Dutch News that the government collected 700,000 Euros from asylum 
seekers within the past four years (2016).   
  The initiative to require payment for use of shelters and provisions could take the place 
of the current policy in which several of the asylum centers have been shut down and failed 
asylum seekers are given a certain amount of time to comply with voluntary return measures 
before being evicted to the streets.  The policy would allow shelters to stay open as all asylum 
seekers would continue to reside in them; the only change would be in the requirement that 
individuals continue to have to pay for the use of facilities and provisions after their application 
has been denied.  Under this policy, the government would still be providing shelter for failed 
asylum seekers, and eliminate the criticisms that the state is not abiding by humanitarian law.  
This would also legally mitigate state costs associated with an increase in homelessness that 
evicting failed asylum seekers would induce.  The costs could also create a small incentive for 
asylum seekers to return as they would realize they would have to pay for temporary lodging 
until they leave the Netherlands, and allow the government to collect payments from failed 
asylum seekers.  
 The current policy relating to the contribution of accommodation costs requires asylum 
seekers to pay money to the COA if their earnings are over 5,895 Euros.  There is a deduction 
from 11,790 Euros in earnings for an entire family.  Also, an asylum seeker must pay 196 Euros 
a month if he or she earns more than 185 Euros a week (Dutch News.nl 2016).  This cost can 
either be lowered or remain the same for failed asylum seekers, but in order to ensure that failed 
asylum seekers are able to pay such costs, it may be necessary to provide them with a conditional 
work visa in which they are allowed to legally work and earn an income.  Otherwise, failed 
asylum seekers may be prompted to work illegally within their own social networks (Siegel 
2011).  Yet, this alternative again fails to provide a mechanism for return, and as such, fails to 
ensure voluntary return actually occurs. 
 
Criminalization of Assistance 
 One alternative that can be implemented in order to increase the efficiency of the new 
policy meant to increase voluntary return by the discontinuation of support for non-compliant 
failed asylum seekers, could be the criminalizing of support for undocumented migrants.  The 
Dutch government could make it illegal to provide shelter and assistance to failed asylum 
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seekers.   According to an interview with Merijn Oudenampsen, a sociologist who worked 
directly with failed asylum seekers who were evicted from shelters in 2012, a policy regarding 
the criminalization of support for failed asylum seekers was already proposed by members of 
Dutch parliament, but it never received enough support.  This criminalization policy was 
supported by the Deputy Justice Minister Red Teevan, the Freedom Party (PVV), and the 
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD).  Its purpose was to criminalize various 
organizations that provide aid to failed asylum seekers after they had been evicted from 
temporary shelters, a process that undermined voluntary return to countries of origin (RNW 
2012). 
 Before the criminalization of support could take effect, the policy would have to be more 
widely supported by the other parliamentary parties.  Chances of this occurrence may be small 
since there remains a large amount of opposition towards the current asylum policy and laws 
regulating immigration (Devaney 2015). If the criminalization policy does receive support and is 
implemented, it could result in a systematic claim of ignorance in which various organizations 
claim they do not know the status of individuals’ residency, undermining the efficiency of such a 
policy.  It is already understood that a number of organizations do not require individuals to 
provide documentation regarding their residency status prior to providing assistance, nor do all 
organizations report undocumented migrants to government authorities (Pleace 2010, 150).  An 
enforcement mechanism would have to be put in place.  A mechanism that would ensure 
organizations are held liable for their knowledge of aiding the undocumented.   The government 
could require organizations to collect documents regarding migrants’ residency prior to 
providing assistance.  This however, may not be enforceable in situations where organizations do 
not collect government funding, or work in municipalities that have refused to comply with the 
conditions set by the state.  Aside from this defect, there could be other negative outcomes that 
result from the criminalization process.  This could include an increase in black market forgery 
and use of unofficial channels to secure documentation.  Individuals may resort to forgery and 
fraudulent manipulation of documents so that they can access various state provisions and aid 
provided by non-government organizations, a practice that can put them at risk of being 
manipulated or in harm’s way as they are reliant on individuals working outside the legality of 
the state (Siegel 2011).  This alternative may increase the efficiency of the new refugee policy as 
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it illegalizes outside assistance of failed asylum seekers, but this process also further contributes 
to the homelessness effects as it does not ensure voluntary return. 
 
Transfer to Detention Centers 
 Another possible alternative is to transfer failed asylum seekers who refuse to comply 
with return preparations immediately to detention shelters after the twenty-eight day period.  
This would ensure that government authorities could keep track of failed asylum seekers, and 
ensure they do not attempt to reside within the state without legal residency. It is in compliance 
with Directive 2008/115/EC, Chapter IV, Article 15, relating to detention for the purpose of 
removal.  This directive allows for a state to place a failed asylum seeker in detention if he 
“avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process” (2008/115/EC, 105).  Also, 
according to Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 and the recast Directive 
2013/33/EU, the Netherlands maintains the right to establish the location of asylum seekers’ 
residence in accordance with its own domestic law, and can reduce asylum seekers freedom of 
movement to a designated area as long as it does not interfere with an individual’s right to 
private life and rights guaranteed by the protocol.  Asylum seekers can even be confined to a 
specific location when there are legality concerns.  These directives justify the use of detention 
for noncomplying failed asylum seekers     
 Transferring uncooperative failed asylum seekers would mitigate the need for the 
provision of shelter at asylum centers and other organizations, and meet the demands of 
international organizations in attending to individuals’ needs of provisions and shelter.  
However, the conditions of detention centers would have to be reevaluated as the Dutch 
government currently receives criticism for its use of detention centers and treatment of asylum 
seekers along with the protocols practiced within them.  Critiques of the detention centers 
involve concerns of humanitarian law, in which case, failure to address these concerns could 
have the potential to cause more issues than that seen in the removal of the bed-bath-bread policy 
for failed asylum seekers.  
 An example of an improved and rights based asylum detention system is seen in Sweden.  
In Sweden’s detention centers, asylum seekers have the freedom to walk around outside in a 
garden, they have a key to their own room, they have internet access and are allowed to keep 
their cellphones, and they can order food and groceries from nearby markets.  Sweden’s centers 
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are setup quite unlike that of a prison.  They are also allowed to have daily visitors, and are not 
subjugated to searches, a critique Dutch detention centers are known for (Kamphuis 2014).  This 
alternative emplaces a mechanism that ensures return, but it does not negate the high costs 
associated with forced returns.  Altogether, the costs associated with changing the detention 
centers, continued provisional support, and forced returns may make this alternative the most 
costly of those suggested. 
 
Do Nothing Scenario 
 The last alternative is the do nothing scenario in which the Netherlands leaves the new 
policy in place as it is.  The effects of this scenario include those as previously discussed in 
association with the problem, and it allows for the aversion of conflict regarding the issue within 
the parties of parliament until the political stronghold changes.  In the future, the parties may 
either take a more collective stance on anti-immigration policies, or an accepting point of view 
on the matter.  However, it must be noted that anti-immigration policies have increased in the 
Netherlands since 2001, and the government’s responsibility for caring for all asylum seeker 
despite their application status has been a conflicting issue since that time as well (Muus 2004, 
264).  Ultimately, the debate of whether or not the Netherlands is responsible for providing food 
and shelter for failed asylum seekers can be seen as being stuck in a repetitive cycle.  The 
government removes provisions, and individuals, municipalities, and various organizations 
complain (Lovett and Schimmer 2001).  The government then reinstates some sort of provision 
for care for failed asylum seekers (Kamphuis 2014).  It is in this practice that gives evidence of 
the government’s failure to concretely answer the question of state responsibility since the 










4) Display and Distinguishing of Alternatives 
 
    
Alternatives Costs Benefits Conclusion 
Return Expansion -significant increase from 
proposed 30 million euros  
 
-forced returns 
-possible incentivizing of return 
 
-possible increase in state of 
origin’s cooperation 
No mechanism that ensures 
return 
 
Increases receiving state’s 
cooperation 
Cost Contribution -reopening of shelters and 
provision of government 
assistance 
 
-failed asylum seekers 
contribute in paying costs 
 
-possible incentivizing of return 
-reduce costs associated with 
homelessness 
 
-avoid further criticisms of HL 
noncompliance 
No mechanism that ensures 
return 
 
Conditional work visas 
may be necessary 
Criminalization -possible noncompliance which 
undermines efficiency 
 
-need for an enforcement 
mechanism 
 
-increase in use of unofficial 
channels 
-increases efficiency of the new 
refugee policy  
 
-punishes those that undermine 
the policy 
No mechanism that ensures 
return 
 
Parliamentary parties may 
not support it 
 
Possible increase in 
criminal activities 







-Mechanism ensures return 
 
-may incentivize compliance 
and voluntary return 
 
-provides failed asylum seekers 
with food and shelter 
Ensures return through 
one means or the other 
 
Conditions and protocols of 
detention centers would 
have to be improved 





-homelessness and its effects on 
state services 
 
-possible HL allegations 
 
-government reduce costs 
associated with providing 
unconditional food and shelter 
 
-parliament subverts further 
refugee disagreement  
No mechanism that ensures 
return 
 
Policy fails to be different 






5) Policy Evaluation 
 As the previous two sections indicate, the new refugee policy has resulted in several 
undesirable outcomes and has the propensity to increase state costs.  There is no indication that it 
will incentivize return, and the absence of a monitoring mechanism outside the use of the 
voluntary return assistance program makes further evaluation of its efficiency difficult.  The new 
policy’s protocol of evicting noncompliant failed asylum seekers and undocumented migrants to 
the streets excludes them from a monitoring process and a mechanism for return.  As discussed 
in the section on quantifying illegal stay, information on these individuals would have to be 
gathered from organizations who work directly with them and from criminal arrest records.  
With an estimation of these statistics, then it may be possible for the government to assess the 
effectiveness of the policy in the coming years.   
 
The Alternative  
 Moving forward, it is suggested that the state reopen the shelters, and start a cost 
contribution program for failed asylum seekers.  This alternative presents the least amount of 
costs for the government, and it would mitigate further criticisms that try to implicate the 
Netherlands of noncompliance to humanitarian law.  It also allows for better monitoring of these 
individuals, and can prevent them from criminal activity and the negative effects associated with 
homelessness.  The easiest course of action for implementing this alternative would be the 
reopening of several regional shelters that were closed.  The total number of shelters needed to 
be reopened is dependent upon how full the current asylum centers are and the number of failed 
refugees requiring shelter.  Because an accurate estimation of how many failed asylum seekers 
requiring shelter cannot be determined due to the fact that the state loses monitoring capabilities 
when they are released to the street, more shelters can be opened as the number of failed asylum 
seekers requiring shelter increase.  So capacity of asylum reception centers should be evaluated, 
and based on that information, a few shelters can be opened until it is deemed necessary to open 
some more.  Once again, this alternative requires failed asylum seekers to have a source of 
income.  To ensure asylum seekers in general do not resort to unconventional or illegal means 
for acquiring wealth, it is necessary that the Immigration and Naturalisation Service provide 
these individuals with conditional work permits.  This process will allow them access to the legal 
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